Great power game

The second half of this book explains the contemporary Chinese diplomacy history in Kissinger's eyes in a larger area. The author tries to start from "Go" and "Sun Tzu's Art of War" to vividly explain the political strategies of new leaders led by Yang Ziren and others, starting from "Go" and "The Art of War".

Thoughts, meticulous analysis and evidence from various examples are very construed! I am really convinced.

Kissinger even believed that: "One of the important reasons why the United States was frustrated in several wars in Asia is that it violated the rules of grandson."

For example, on August 23, 1958, in order to test the degree of US commitment to defend Daiwan and to enhance China's global influence, the People's Liberation Army began to launch large-scale artillery bombardment on Kinmen.

Yang Ziren explained that after China demonstrated its military determination, it will restart talks with the United States, so that "there are both places of action and negotiation."

Kissinger interpreted this as "Seeking Survival in the Fight" in "The Art of War" used the past to the present, with the purpose of turning strong enemies into weak enemies and carrying out offensive deterrence strategies.

The Soviet Union's various tough moves since the Stalin era were long disliked by Yang Ziren, even though China and the Soviet Union were still allies.

Interestingly, three weeks before the shelling of Kinmen, Khrushchev had just visited Beijing, causing Eisenhower to accuse the Soviet Union of instructing Yang Ziren to do so.

On the issue of Daiwan, Yang Ziren used Khrushchev's dilemma to induce him to issue a nuclear threat. Khrushchev himself admitted that the nuclear threat that he had unintentionally implemented limited the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States to tension.

Yang Ziren treated Khrushchev as a pawn and an actor in the script, and won a major publicity victory and returned to the ambassador-level talks with "full confidence". Therefore, the leaders of two socialist countries:

Yang Ziren and Khrushchev were judged immediately.

These are also reflected in previous foreign wars.

"For Mao, the Western concept of deterrence is too passive. He refuses China to stand in a passive position of being beaten. He takes the initiative whenever possible.

To some extent, this is similar to the Western concept of preemptive action, that is, attack first to prevent attacks. But according to Western principles, preemptive action is to win military victory. The difference between Mao's preemptive action is his psychological deterrence beyond his expectations.

His motivation is not just to launch a military strike that determines the outcome, rather than to change the psychological balance, not to defeat the enemy but to reverse the result of risk calculations.

As we see in later chapters, China's actions in the Taiwan Strait crisis between 1954 and 58, the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, the Sino-Suzu Ussuri River battle between 1969 and 71, and the Sino-Vietnam War in 1979.

There is a common characteristic: first, a brave sudden attack and then a political struggle.

In the eyes of the Chinese, after pulling both sides back into the psychological equation, the real purpose of deterrence is achieved.”

Especially the war in resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea, this surprised Kissinger the most.

"No military scientist can think that the People's Liberation Army, which had just been freed from the civil war, equipped with seized Kuomintang weapons, could fight a modern army supported by atomic bombs." But China sent troops, and the reason was that after Kissinger consulted a large amount of information

Declaration:
Chapter completed!