Guan Yu took advantage of the fact that Wen Chou Zhang Liao and Tuo Yi met, and finally gave Zhang Liao a fiercely. In addition, Tuo Yi failed to "surround Wei and save Zhao" that day, and Yuan Jun lost more than 10,000 living forces, and even killed a general Hao Meng, a captain-level general, which was completely destroyed.

For Yuan Shao, who still has nearly 400,000 soldiers, the actual losses caused by this series of failures are actually acceptable, but the morale of the army is really terriblely sluggish when it is tortured like this.

Guan Gu died in the surprise attack of Shimen, Yang Chou died in the wild king Supo, Hao Meng died in the field and was defeated by the field battle... From the surprise attack of the dangerous pass to the upright city attack, and then to the frontal field battle, Guan Yu argued from three angles: No matter what kind of war mode Yuan Shao’s army fought with the Han army, he was no match!

With Guan Yu's victory in the front battlefield, Yuan's army did not dare to fight again and temporarily fell into a shrinking defensive stance in the winter. As the chief of the Grand Marshal, Zhuge Liang also stood in the Yewang City behind, secretly writing about the first few military tactics in his life.

Zhuge Liang, in history, wrote "Twenty-Four Chapters of the Art of War" throughout his life. With Li Su's teachings and more practical experience in this life, he naturally had no less operations to write diaries, notes, and sum up his life experience.

Moreover, the original "Twenty-Four Chapters of the Art of War" is said to be the art of war, but in fact, the articles that really discuss the last third of the war are all about internal affairs, scheduling and raising money and raising, hiring people, assessment, military governance, military law, etc.

In this life, Zhuge Liang had to write much more things, so he naturally would not mix everything together. Insider affairs, people, science and mathematics, these will be used separately, and military strategy will focus on military affairs, including logistics and military governance at most.

This time, taking advantage of the leisure of winter combat, he started with military governance and logistics dispatch, wrote about some experiences in siege battles, and finally wrote about his summary of Guan Yu's field battle experience.

Because he was still young and only eighteen years old, Zhuge Liang did not intend to write much, so he kept digging and filling in slowly. He was not so arrogant that he felt that he could finish the book at once. His language also tended to be oral notes, and he kept updating based on his practical experience. When he was about to finish the book in the future, he would rewrite it with concise and beautiful writing style.

"The experience of winning several field battles in Taiwei Hanoi proves that the internal dispatching side has an absolute advantage in concentrating superior forces in the battle of tens of thousands of medium-sized corps.

The reason why Zhang Liao and Kuo Yi were defeated was that they had a horn protection distance of dozens of miles, which required two hours of marching and assembly. This time difference would not have obvious loopholes at normal combat speed.

However, in front of the high-speed corps that were more than ordinary people expected, as well as the right distance between our army's attack camp and Zhang and the right sluggishness, the flaws that were broken were leaked... "

Zhuge Liang not only summarized the current experience of this battle, but also quoted classics and included similar battles in history, eliminated the drought and preserved the essence, sought common ground while reserving differences, and compared and analyzed.

Finally, Zhuge Liang summarized a rule that he thought was very reasonable: when the total force that the warring sides could dispatch in a battle was less than 100,000, and the total force of the front line of the warring sides was less than 200,000, the "inside combat" side had an absolute concentrated advantageous force to defeat the enemy.

Of course, Zhuge Liang did not write the military term "inside combat" directly, a military term that appeared in later generations, but organized it in his own language. But it means "the two armies were in the central position when confronted, and the maneuver distance was shorter."

For example, in this battle around the Yewang, Zhang Liao was on the Danshui side of the Yewang North, and Que Yi was on the Qinshui side of the Yewang East, and Guan Yu, who was not in the middle, was dispatched to each other. This was an opportunity.

If Li Suneng was in Hebei at this moment, he would be shocked to see these military notes written by Zhuge Liang: Isn’t this the important experience of summarizing the victory of the emperor in the early 19th century in later generations, Yomini and Clausewitz, two major European military theorists, summarized the important experience of winning the emperor?

(Note: Everyone is familiar with Clausewitz, so there is no need to introduce it. Jomini is a little less famous than him, but he is also the second in the world in the 19th century. Clausewitz is considered to be the number one military theory scholar on the anti-French alliance, while Jomini is the number one military theory scholar on the French army, but their research direction is the same, they all study why the emperor wins a battle)

But it’s true that Guan Yu’s successive victory in the Battle of Hanoi is actually very similar to the “Battle of Mantua Fortress” in the famous battle of Emperor Na’s in Italy.

However, the Emperor used the anti-French allies on the outside to mobilize a weak time difference to reach the Mantua Fortress, and beat the enemy to a gourd baby to save his grandfather. Guan Yu replaced the Mantua Fortress with the Wild King City, and the rest were almost the same. It can be said to be a masterpiece of simple military strategy.

But the reason why Zhuge Liang was a genius was that if he wrote the military tactics of the dignified formation and only summarized them to the level of Jomini and Clausewitz, he would not deserve to be called Zhuge Liang.

Zhuge Liang obviously went further, learned from history, and cooperated with his own deduction to give full play to his god-level arithmetic deduction talent.

Zhuge Liang pointed out in combination with history: This kind of advantage of mobilizing the enemy in the inside line to pull out the time difference in arrival at the battlefield is not absolute, but is restricted by the total force of the war between the two sides.

This move is useful at present because the total combat force between the two sides is only 70,000 to 80,000, so one side in the inside can turn all the troops into an iron fist to attack. If the number of troops is too large, reaching more than 100,000, or even more, then all the troops cannot be put into the front line.

At this time, perhaps the "outside combat" side will gain the advantage of concentrated advantage of "investing more total forces from different directions to the same battlefield at the same time".

This point has actually been repeatedly proved by history later. For example, the Battle of Guandu, the Battle of Chibi, and even the Battle of Feishui in history were all after a massive amount of troops. Although the more soldiers tried to continue to concentrate troops on the inside, there were too many people and could not pile up on the same battlefield from one direction.

At this time, if the weak defeats the strong, and defeats the pioneers with a large number of people, the more powerful ones, the more people, it is easy to be unable to invest in the subsequent stacking and be defeated.

Of course, Zhuge Liang could not know these things that had not happened yet, so in the comparison of military tactics, he summarized them with Liu Bang and Xiang Yu's Battle of Pengcheng.

Xiang Yu was undoubtedly a top genius who "fights inside and achieves local concentration of superior forces". He led 30,000 cavalry and always formed an iron fist, killing Liu Bang, who could not assemble and could not reach the battlefield at the same time, almost destroyed.

Liu Bang Pengcheng's defeat was also because there were many others, and he was unable to exert his external advantages. He could not let his 560,000 people exert efforts from different directions to the same goal at the same time and at the same place, so the extra manpower temporarily became invalid manpower.

However, Zhuge Liang also pointed out keenly: It is difficult to reach the sky when the number of people far exceeds 100,000, just like the arm and fingers that make the army work towards the same target from different directions!

Perhaps, in the future, if there are better remote military order communication methods, or faster external force dispatch and assembly methods, the fault tolerance of this matter can be improved, the time difference between being beaten by the enemy's inside gods and achieving the probability of local superior forces.

This discussion of military tactics is also a shocking thing. If Li Su saw it, he would definitely be amazed: Isn’t this the upgrade of the military theories of the German General Staff Moltch against Jomini and Clausewitz in the old era after the development of railways and telegraph technologies in the 1860s!

Moltke saw the emergence of telegrams and railways, and realized that "hundreds of thousands of troops made precise appointments for one moment, arrived at the same target from different directions and attacked at the same time", so he changed the old military argument that Josch's emphasized that "it was necessary to grab the inside line to facilitate concentrating troops."

In fact, Moltke later used history to prove his advantage in the strategic thinking of the outside line. His enemies, Grand Duke Albrecht of Austria, and even Napoleon III of France, believed in the inside line idea of ​​the emperor sixty years ago. However, as soon as the railway telegram appeared, the efficiency of mobilization and assembly in the inside line was not as efficient as that of the outside line.

Napoleon III learned from his uncle, but the result was that the battle of Seed could only gather 120,000 people at the same place and at the same time, while Moltke could gather 200,000 people, and at the same time, he would not give him a time difference.

Later history has repeatedly proved that before the emergence of mechanized troops, the maximum assembly efficiency limit of a single camp in the inside line was only about 100,000 people. No matter how many people were, they would not be stacked on a single battlefield. Not only was the battle like this, but the earlier Battle of Waterloo was the same. At Waterloo, the French army was only 80,000, and the anti-French allies such as the British and Putravaganza combined with 120,000.

Neither side will have any external attacks, that is, both sides can only invest 100,000 people. If one side learns to reach the outside attacks at the same time, then the other side can invest several times more, such as Moltke's 200,000.

However, some people may wonder: Zhuge Liang could not predict the existence of Mao Qi. How could he predict that "the advancement of communication and transportation technology can increase the fault tolerance of the outside advantage, and the critical point of the transformation of the inside advantage and the outside advantage is that each side has a force of 100,000 people"?

The answer is: Zhuge Liang still found the answer from history and compared and thought about it before writing it like this.

It has to be admitted that the long history of China is a treasure house. Even people from the late Han Dynasty can find enough experiences for their predecessors. The key is to see how intelligent the people who read history themselves are and whether they will follow the examples and summarize them.

The "Molty" character that Zhuge Liang found in history was Han Xin.

The reason is simple: In the Battle of Gaixia, there were 100,000 Chu troops and 300,000 Han troops. Han Xin made a solid job of "300,000 people attacked in a split second, and at the same time outputted against Xiang Yu, not allowing Xiang Yu, who was inside, to seize the time difference between each defeat."

It can be seen that Han Xin is a person who does not need technical assistance such as telegrams and trains, and can also accurately place 300,000 people in different directions at the same time as his arm and finger.

On the other hand, Han Xin often uses hundreds of thousands of soldiers together, so it is not good to use micro-cam. When his troops exceed 100,000, micro-cam is not the most important. It is the most important to let hundreds of thousands of people enter the output position of the station stake at the same time. The rest is only possible to go up F2A.

Xiang Yu on the opposite side was the world's number one inside player at that time. In fact, he had never exerted the full power of hundreds of thousands of people in his life. When Xiang Yu was able to lead 100,000 people, he encountered an opponent of the same order of magnitude in the world.

When encountering an opponent with hundreds of thousands of people (Liu Bang, Zhang Han), Xiang Yu could "not let the enemy's hundreds of thousands of people pile up in front of me at the same time, and let the enemy be killed by me for 100,000 and then 100,000. The subsequent enemy troops were defeated because the vanguard was destroyed before they could fight. In this way, no matter whether the enemy was 300,000 or 500,000, I could slowly destroy it."

Han Xin's micro-job is actually far inferior to Xiang Yu, but Han Xin can make 300,000 people pile on Xiang Yu's face at the same time, allowing 300,000 people to stand and output 100,000 Chu troops at the same time, instead of "200,000 in the rear row are blocked and gaI outside the range, and 100,000 in the front row dies before the rear row can be output". If this is done, you will win.

Zhuge Liang combined today's practical gains and comparisons with history, when he wrote this, he even suddenly had a flash of inspiration and gained a new understanding of the cliché in "Records of the Grand Historian":

"Records of the Grand Historian. Biography of the Marquis of Huaiyin" describes Liu Bang and Han Xin talking about the talent of everyone leading troops. Han Xin commented on Liu Bang saying, "Your Majesty is only 100,000 soldiers. The more the soldiers the ministers are, the better." This is basically known to all scholars.

Zhuge Liang originally read books, but after reading this, he simply felt that this showed that although Liu Bang was not good at using troops, he was good at using people and was good at controlling civil officials and military generals.

But at this moment, as he himself was writing a military strategy summarizing the battle of the Wild King, and recalling this sentence in the biography of the Marquis of Huaiyin, he suddenly realized:

Han Xin commented on Liu Bang with another meaning! That is, Liu Bang and Xiang Yu are both internal combat generals, and their ability to attack and command troops on the outside is still flawed! (Liu Bang's outside is of course much worse than Xiang Yu's outside)

Han Xin's words are his own simple understanding of the critical scale of military efficiency of the inside and outside generals! However, Han Xin cannot write about military tactics and has not summarized these experiences that can only be understood but not expressed in words! (It may also be that Han Xin does not want to summarize, but wants to cherish his own experience as his own unique experience)

"There are a higher command limit for both sides' respective forces below 100,000. The upper limit for the inside famous generals is higher. The respective forces of both sides' respective forces far exceed 100,000. The upper limit for the outside famous generals is higher. However, it is rare to meet famous generals on the outside who can control this level of external lines for generations.

Since the Han Dynasty, only Han Xin and Wei Qing could not make a thousand-mile attack, and arrived at the same time. Therefore, there were historical lessons such as Li Guang getting lost and delaying. Huo Qubing could only achieve Xiang Yu's single-way attack inside general, and his tactics were far inferior to Xiang Yu, and there was no way to talk about multi-line strategic coordination.

If we do not have the communication and traffic control that is as wonderful as the best, we can only rely on the advancement of logistics and military information transmission technology to make up for the shortcomings. This time, our army is expected to make up for the timing of joint attacks by the outside army, and we must also rely on our army's faster military information transmission and logistics marching speed than Yuan Shao's army.

In the future, to further utilize this advantage, we must work hard on messaging and troop transport speed, and use new technologies to win more strategic assembly efficiency advantages."

After writing these experiences, Zhuge Liang was already wondering how to obtain greater efficiency advantages in the accumulation and stacking of troops in the subsequent situation of "Liu Bei and Yuan Shao's two major camps must mobilize 200,000 to reinforce the front line" and allow his own camp to gain greater advantages in the efficiency of military force accumulation and stacking.

With the unbreakable advanced strategic guiding ideology of truth level, there is not so much trouble in actual micro-operation.
Chapter completed!