The material consumption of 110,000 yen and the casualties of 24 people are not even comparable to the consumption and casualty indicators of a Japanese division conducting an actual combat exercise, and the benefits obtained are tantamount to winning dozens of super jackpots.
The Japanese government did not support the Japanese military's actions in the first place because it was afraid of triggering a long-term war between China and Japan, thereby completely pushing the government finances that were already facing bankruptcy into the abyss.
But now, it is equivalent to the government getting so much land, resources and money without spending a penny. Only people with brain damage will persist in opposing it.
Therefore, under this circumstance, the Japanese government and people immediately turned to support the Japanese army's actions, and made the occupation and rule of Northeast China a national policy for Japan's next development.
Now, the Great Wall War of Resistance actually ended with another defeat for China, and the new round of negotiations between China and Japan is nearing its end.
As the losing party, China had little room for bargaining. In fact, it could only acquiesce to the legality of Japan's occupation of the three northeastern provinces and Rehe Province, and agreed to the conditions proposed by the Japanese, recognizing 22 areas in eastern Hebei including Changping and Tongxian.
The county is a "demilitarized zone".
The so-called demilitarized zone actually means that China is not allowed to station troops or set up military defense lines. However, the Japanese army is not actually restricted by this contract (you have no ability to restrict it even if you want to). This means that the entire North China is open to the armed forces of the Japanese army.
Under surveillance and control, the Japanese army could invade Pingjin and Jicha at any time.
Under such circumstances, if a few years later, the Japanese officers and soldiers, who have gradually encroached on the walls of Peiping and Tianjin, stir up trouble again, and there is a high possibility that they may directly attack Peking and Tianjin, will you fight or not?
Now, after listening to Zhou Wen's detailed analysis, the principal began to lean towards Zhou Wen's judgment.
In other words, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War is not about whether the Japanese government wants to fight, but whether the Japanese troops stationed in North China want to fight. Will they find an excuse to launch an attack just like the September 18th Incident?
This time will be significantly shorter than the previously predicted 7 to 8 years, and the unpredictability will also increase significantly.
So, the question arises, even if China is not ready for war in a few years, can it continue to make concessions to Japan?
For example, give up Peiping and Tianjin? Give up the North China Plain?
The principal himself knew that it was impossible for China to give in anymore. If even China's core cities like Peking and Tianjin were to be surrendered to the Japanese, then, let alone the issue of bearing historical infamy, the question was whether he could hold his position as the head of the country.
Keeping and protecting are two different things.
Moreover, step by step concessions will inevitably encourage the ambitions of the Japanese. They don’t know where the retreat will end. Do they still have to retreat to Yazhou and jump into the sea collectively?
Therefore, the principal knows that next time, if the Japanese army provokes trouble again, the Chinese army will definitely rise up to fight. As both sides continue to increase their military investment, a full-scale war will be inevitable.
Taking this into consideration, the principal immediately felt a strong sense of urgency and crisis.
He glanced at Zhou Wen with a complicated expression, considered it for a moment, and then slowly asked: "Based on your analysis, do you think we will be the victor in the future war between China and Japan?"
In fact, this question has been lingering in the principal's mind for a long time, and he has also asked many knowledgeable people in the staff and military.
It stands to reason that as the head of a country, he would only ask this question to his close staff and senior military experts, not to young officers with inexperienced qualifications like Zhou Wen.
But after Zhou Wen's insightful analysis just now, he no longer underestimates the young man in front of him, but regards him as an expert with a certain strategic vision who can give him very constructive opinions.
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Moreover, although he had received affirmative answers from many military experts and professionals before, none of them had a convincing analytical basis.
He also wanted to hear Zhou Wen's opinion on this.
Zhou Wen, who has memories of two lifetimes, has already prepared a draft on this issue.
And it happened to be a theory that he wanted to find an opportunity to state to the principal.
This theory, of course, can only be a protracted war.
You must know that in the history of the Republic of China, many knowledgeable people have proposed and realized that the war with Japan will be a protracted war, which is the concept of protracted war.
However, there is no systematic elaboration, or a clear idea, on the specific implementation and strategic strategy of protracted war.
It was not until four years later, on the eve of the outbreak of the all-out Anti-Japanese War, that the most outstanding military theorist and military educator of the Republic of China, Mr. Jiang Baili, published the military treatise "On National Defense" in 1937 and began to systematically describe the long-lasting strategy against Japan.
The strategy of the war of resistance.
To sum up, there are three:
First, China is not afraid of swallowing up Japan, but is afraid of cannibalizing it. Therefore, it should not retreat step by step against Japan, but should proactively carry out a comprehensive war of resistance and turn the Japanese rear into the front, so that it has no time to digest the occupied areas, so that Japan cannot use the occupation.
Improve combat effectiveness in areas;
Second, take the initiative to attack the Japanese army in Shanghai and force the Japanese army's main offensive route to change from the north-south route of Northeast-North China-Central China-South China to the east-west route along the Yangtze River, thus making full use of the mountains and lakes and swamps along the river to offset the Japanese army's weapon training
Advantage;
Third, drag down Japan through the consumption of time. The specific method is to drag the Japanese army into the second geographical ridge of China, that is, the junction of Hunan and Sichuan, and engage in a decisive stalemate with the Japanese army.
Although Mr. Jiang Baili died young in the 27th year of the Republic of China (1938), the development of the Sino-Japanese war happened exactly as he expected, reflecting his accurate grasp of the strength and strategic situation of the two countries.
Moreover, in an article published shortly before his death, he even more eloquently put forward the guiding principles for China's future strategy towards Japan - "Whether you win or lose, just don't make peace with it!"
Mr. Baili has foreseen that the Sino-Japanese war will be cruel and protracted, and due to the huge gap in national power between China and Japan, China will inevitably retreat at the beginning of the war, pay a heavy price, and lose a large amount of territory.
However, we will not make peace with you, we will not negotiate with you, and we will drag you to death.
During the eight-year all-out war of resistance against Japan, the principal and the Republic of China government, although they had some hesitations and waverings, they always followed Mr. Baili's strategic plan and dragged Japan into the quagmire of the Chinese battlefield and was unable to extricate itself. It forced it to finally
They could only turn to Southeast Asia to start a war with Britain and the United States, which ultimately led to failure.
However, in "On National Defense", Mr. Baili only talked about the strategy of protracted war, but did not explain the theoretical basis for why China won the final victory.
Only one year after the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, the great man, the founder of the Republic, clearly stated the conditions and basis for China's victory over Japan in "On Protracted War".