In fact, many of Tian Boguang's views were the result of many discussions with Zhou Wen, and they included many of Zhou Wen's experiences and historical lessons learned from later generations.
But the effect of Zhou Wen's explanation is not as good as that of Tian Boguang. For example, the brothers in the mercenary group and Zhao Changshu all know that Tian Boguang was a Japanese soldier. It is only natural that he knows the details of the Japanese army, and it is also authoritative and convincing. You, Zhou Wen, are the only one.
How come you, a native of Shanxi, China, know so much about the Japanese army? Are you bragging?
Therefore, it is only appropriate for Tian Boguang to speak. However, Zhou Wenchu deliberately wanted to inform every Chinese officer about the basic tactics and combat effectiveness of the Japanese army. However, due to confidentiality reasons, he can only start with Zhao Changshu's headquarters.
In particular, the bravery of the Japanese army and the tactical literacy of its officers and soldiers are ranked among the best in the world, even among the best.
A seemingly simple roundabout attack tactic was used to the extreme by the Japanese army during World War II. From generals to sergeants, everyone could use this tactic flexibly and achieve success in most cases.
Successful examples abound. The biggest example is that during the Japanese invasion of Burma, the Japanese general Yamashita Tombumi, known as the "Malay Tiger", used a wind-like rapid detour tactic to surprise the Burmese town of Myitkyina, causing the British army to
The entire front was shaken and defeated, thus determining the direction of the war in Myanmar.
In the famous Battle of Xuzhou on the Chinese battlefield, when the Chinese army had already won the great victory at Taierzhuang, the Japanese army saw no hope of a frontal breakthrough, so they used part of their forces to contain the front, and the main force circled westward in an attempt to encircle Xuzhou from the side and rear and annihilate China's third army.
Although the main force in the fifth theater did not achieve the goal of annihilating the main force of the Chinese army in the end, it forced the Chinese army to abandon Xuzhou.
It can be said that the roundabout tactic is the only tactical option for any combat unit of the Japanese army, and it has been deeply rooted in the bones of officers at all levels. It seems simple, but it has repeatedly frustrated the Chinese army. Even when the frontal numbers and firepower are not superior, the Japanese army
Still dare to boldly divide the troops to carry out roundabout attacks.
Generally speaking, it is very simple to break the Japanese army's roundabout tactics. First, concentrate superior forces and then divide the troops to attack the enemy in one go;
The second is to mobilize superior forces to ambush the enemy on the flanks.
However, due to the uneven quality of the Chinese army's soldiers and officers, and the poor equipment of the troops, it is difficult to achieve tactical goals. The annihilation battles often turn into stalemate battles, and ambushes are succeeded by the enemy's surprise attack. As a result, in many cases, it is clearly our own troops that occupy the majority.
The terrain was superior, but the Japanese army took the initiative on the battlefield. The outcome can be imagined.
Zhou Wen will ask Tian Boguang to inform these front-line Chinese officers who will lead their troops to the anti-Japanese front line in the future with these experiences and countermeasures summarized by later generations, so that they can at least have a preliminary understanding of the Japanese army's combat power and tactical level.
Cognition, and a rational comparison and vigilance of the combat power and tactical levels of the Japanese army and our army.
Although the combat power, equipment and even tactical level of our army are not as good as those of the other side, at least we will not lose in the future and be completely defeated. Zhou Wen did not expect that just a few lessons can turn defeat into victory for these future anti-Japanese generals, but even if they lose, they will not be defeated.
Don't lose too cowardly, don't lose so much that it's worthless.
At this time, Tian Boguang had already introduced the organization and composition of the Japanese infantry brigade. His clear and confident voice still echoed in the conference room.
"A standard 1,100-man brigade of the Japanese army includes: a 30-man brigade headquarters, a 110-man transport squadron with carts and mules, four infantry squadrons, and a 174-man machine gun squadron with a 14-man squadron headquarters.
And 3 machine gun teams, and 1 ammunition team, each machine gun team has 4 heavy machine guns, a total of 12 guns.
A 55-man artillery squad includes a 10-man squad, a 15-man ammunition squad, and two 15-man squads each equipped with a 70mm Type 92 infantry cannon. Very few troops will be equipped with a 122
The manned artillery battery includes a 27-man ammunition squad and two 31-man artillery squads, each equipped with 2 infantry guns.
The infantry brigade is the most basic combat unit in the Japanese army with independent combat capabilities. All infantry tactics of the Japanese army are actually implemented and completed around the infantry brigade. When necessary, artillery, trucks and tanks can even be strengthened as a battle-level
It is used as an independent tactical unit, which is a decisive force used to conduct roundabout flank attacks.
Let’s look at the weapons and equipment of such a brigade. There are about 500 Type 38 rifles, 36 Taisho 11-type light machine guns, which are commonly known as crooked light machine guns in China, 48 grenades, and Taisho III
There are 12 heavy machine guns of the 2016 model and 2 70mm 92 infantry guns.
It seems that the firepower configuration of the Japanese army's brigade is similar to that of our regiment, and the number of troops may be a little less. Does that mean that one of our Chinese army's regiments can compete with one of the Japanese army's brigade?
In fact, it is not the case. Here I want to focus on the use of grenades and machine guns by the Japanese army. In the conventional tactics of the Japanese army, squads, that is, detachments, are rarely used as independent units. Basically, squads are used as the smallest tactical execution unit to fight.
All the team's tactics revolve around machine guns and grenade launchers.
The Japanese army advocates offense, and its infantry squad tactics are based on attack, emphasizing the speed and method of troops engaging with the enemy while traveling. The Japanese infantry squad-level tactics are mostly initiated from a point between 400 and 600 meters.
The infantry team clearly understands the direction of attack and available terrain and features, and determines the tactical essentials such as staged shelter points for each squad. Then it is divided into groups. After the machine gun group and grenade group enter the first shooting position, each group will head towards the first firing position.
Cover point maneuver.
In other words, the tactics of the Japanese infantry squad were to use machine guns and grenade launchers as the center of fire, while elite infantry outflanked and penetrated the flanks.
It can be said that 90% of the battles of the Japanese infantry squad are this kind of two-wing penetration, with 2-4 attack groups on the front, and special emphasis is placed on equipping officers above the sergeant of the infantry squad with telescopes to observe enemy machine gun and mortar positions.
position. Then use grenades, light machine guns and excellent shooters to first attack the enemy's heavy machine gun, light machine gun and mortar fire points. If these fire points are lost, the enemy will lose 80% of its fire power, and then the two wings will be interspersed with troops and
From the front, the Japanese troops could penetrate to a distance of 100 meters and launch a bayonet charge.
