Digong has extremely complex and sharp ethnic conflicts, which is the reason why it is more turbulent and backward than neighboring countries.
Ever since the anti-colonial movement surged in the early 1960s, large and small turmoils in Digong have not subsided, making the entire country full of boredom and even hatred for the turmoil. The calls for ethnic reconciliation and integration have gradually become mainstream.
The moderate or conciliatory faction of the ethnic group has been gradually pushed to the forefront, which is also an indisputable fact in Digong.
Otherwise, no matter how powerful Cao Mo is, he will not be able to orchestrate the election of moderate figures who have established a cooperative relationship with Tianyue in the new round of regional elections in Quekotos.
In the final analysis, what Cao Mo did was to select moderate figures with greater influence and ability to establish cooperative relationships with them.
The fact that these moderate figures finally gained power in the local area was mainly due to the current situation in Digong.
Even if Cao Mo did something behind the scenes, it was just adding fuel to the flames.
With the local forces in the region, Cao Mo personally established close relations from scratch, initially with Longta.
At that time, he had nothing, so he had to do everything by himself.
In Drake and Dahomey, even though he could not do many things personally, he still invested a lot of energy in selectively communicating with some local forces and representatives and establishing close personal relationships.
That was also to build a sufficiently wide moat in Akwa for the huge benefit of the Usang River copper and gold mine.
The Saiwei family is extremely powerful in Akwa, but for the time being, it has no way to defeat Tianyue. The main reason is that the Saiwei family easily dare not overthrow the democratically elected system of mutual checks and balances between local and central governments; while Drake's local forces are almost all on the side of Tianyue.
Happy here.
If there are relatively powerful families or tribes in the Drake area that stand against Ibogu Mining, or are willing to be used as weapons by the Savvy family and the Evans Foundation, things will become very difficult.
At least it is difficult to maintain normal production at the Wusang River copper-gold mine.
Now the Usang River Copper and Gold Mine can still maintain normal production, and the Seviyi family is inconvenient to publicly come out to attack the Ibogu mining industry. This has also confused many people in Akwa, thinking that the rumors are just rumors.
Benin's status and role in Tianyue's overall chess game are extremely prominent, but Benin is still a country no matter how small it is.
Although Cao Mo had intentions, he was not arrogant enough to directly and blatantly control the political situation of a country.
Therefore, in Cotonou-Podonov, the main way to establish relations with the political dignitaries of the Benin authorities was through Tubman Jr. and others, and they did not deliberately support any force to come to power.
If they acted too aggressively in Benin and any European or American country thought that Tianyue's existence would affect their overall interests in the Gulf of Guinea and interfered, Cao Mo would have been too late to cry.
Cao Mo personally established connections with local forces in Kuikotos from scratch, and even influenced regional elections to a certain extent. The main reason was that Kuikotos was too important in Tianyue's West African industrial investment map.
At this time, Quekotos was far from being of importance in the country of Digon, or even in the entire Gulf of Guinea area.
However, the status of Quekotos in the minds of Langhua Petroleum executives cannot be ignored.
Tianyue was able to successfully establish a cooperative relationship with all members of the new municipal committee of Quekotos in such a short period of time, which is considered a big miracle in the eyes of Langhua Petroleum's senior executives.
Not only Jacques Césaire, but also other senior officials of Langhua Petroleum later reflected on Quekotos's crackdown on piracy and the frustration of the oil field exploration plan. They all realized that they underestimated their opponents and overly ignored local forces.
In recent years, Langhua Petroleum has not thought about restarting the mining operations of the Quekotos Oilfield.
In fact, even if they weigh the pros and cons and delay taking action, deep down they really want to do it, think about it every year, and make a lot of plans and plans for it.
When negotiating cooperation in the first quarter, Langhua Petroleum's senior executives, including Jacques Césaire, had an open attitude and never gave up their efforts to find new buyers.
By September, Jacques Césaire's report was submitted to the desks of other senior executives of Langhua Petroleum and even to the board of directors. No one could deny that Tianyue's work in Quekotos for less than four months was actually done by them.
The most perfect start to a restart that has been envisioned over the years but failed to be implemented.
If there is any flaw, it is that the technical strength and equipment of Fulkov Oilfield Service Company are somewhat weak.
However, with the assistance of engineers sent by Langhua Petroleum and CNOOC experts and engineering teams hired by Fulkov Oilfield Services, the No. 1 drilling platform produced oil more than three months earlier than optimistic expectations.
A few years ago, it was possible to operate multiple wells simultaneously.
The overhaul of the No. 2 and No. 3 drilling platforms has also started at the same time, and it is very likely that they will achieve oil production before the end of the year; by March next year, multiple wells will be able to operate simultaneously.
Optimistic estimates suggest that by the middle of next year, the daily production volume of the Quekotos Oilfield will return to a high of 30,000 barrels.
Therefore, in his report, Jacques Sesaire strongly recommended that the group abandon its plan to sell the Quekotos oil field.
On the eve of Langhua Petroleum's formal acquisition of the Quekotos Oilfield, the world economy was affected by the Asian financial crisis, a drop in demand, and OPEC's untimely increase in production.
The price of Brent crude oil fell from US$24 in 1997 to US$9 at the end of 1998.
By March 1999, international crude oil futures prices began to rebound, but until Langhua Petroleum officially signed a contract to acquire the Quekotos oil field, the price of Brent crude oil did not exceed US$30 per barrel.
Against this background, Langhua Petroleum acquired the mining rights of the Quekotos oil field and three comprehensive semi-submersible drilling platforms and other ancillary facilities for a total price of US$2 billion.
The Quekotos drilling robbery caused huge and irreparable losses to Langhua Petroleum. What's more, the pressure brought by negative public opinion made Langhua Petroleum even worse at the peak of the crude oil price surge in 2007 and 2008.
The failure to make a decision to restart the Quekotos oil field was mainly due to the fact that the peak period of oil prices was too short.
If international crude oil futures had stayed at US$120 to US$150 per barrel for three to five more months, it might have started again.
At least the first half of 2008 is the moment closest to a restart.
Even today, the international economy has not completely emerged from the shadow of the subprime mortgage crisis, but the international crude oil futures price has steadily rebounded to more than 80 US dollars per barrel, which is far higher than the five years before the year 2000.
average price.
The Quekotos Oilfield is located in Digong Bay, covering an area of more than 20,000 square kilometers. Although it is not a super large oil field, the current proven economic reserves are about 800 million barrels, but the waters are shallow, the wind and waves are calm, and the oil is rich.
The area is complete. A comprehensive semi-submersible drilling platform can carry out multiple well operations at the same time, with high production. The mining cost is not much higher than that on land (including land transportation), and the economic value is very large.
In addition to the great potential for further exploration, the Quekotos Oilfield currently has only three comprehensive semi-submersible drilling platforms. More new drilling platforms can be added in the future, increasing the annual production scale from the current 10 million
Barrels increased to 25 million barrels.
If the perfect start to the cooperation with Fulkov Oilfield Service Company can be continued, and the international economic situation can remain stable, theoretically, Langhua Petroleum can obtain more than one billion U.S. dollars from the Quekotos Oilfield every year, and the total amount can be obtained within the authorization period.
Extra profits of US$200 to US$25 billion or more.
Of course, Langhua Petroleum now wants to increase its offer from US$4 billion to more than US$8 billion, and the possibility of finding a buyer for the Quekotos oil field is slim.
If the oil field price is less than 8 billion US dollars, it will be a huge loss.
So why doesn’t Langhua Petroleum cooperate more closely with Fulkov Petrochemical Group, so that the current perfect start can be maintained, and the energy from the Quekotos Oilfield can continue to create exciting excess revenue for Langhua Petroleum?
profit?
Closer cooperation means that the exploration, production, maintenance, transportation, sales and subsequent drilling construction of the Quekotos oil field will be completely handed over to the Verkov Oilfield Company Langhua Petroleum, not directly from France.
By sending employees to dangerous areas to carry out operations, there is no need to bear the pressure from international public opinion.
Of course, the premise is that Langhua Petroleum completely abandons the plan to sell the Quekotos Oilfield, or even if it still wants to sell it, it must bundle the production cooperation agreement of the Fulkov Oilfield Service Company to ensure that the Fulkov Oilfield Service Company
Interests.
Only in this way can Tianyue be persuaded to further strengthen the technical team building of Fulkov Oilfield Service Company and purchase more advanced offshore engineering equipment.
If you also want to use Fulkov Oilfield Service Company to strengthen exploration in other areas of the oil field and add new drilling platforms to increase the scale of production, the investment will be even higher.
In other words, as the comprehensive technology and equipment strength of Fulkov Oilfield Service Company improves, the mining scale of Quekotos Oilfield will be further increased, and the interests of Langhua Petroleum can be protected and further expanded.
Ordinary offshore repair and maintenance ships are fine, but a comprehensive semi-submersible drilling platform costs as much as 150 million to 200 million US dollars.
How can Tianyue be expected to further invest in Fulkov Oilfield Service Company without further bundling, or without signing a longer-term, irrevocable cooperation agreement?
Not to mention that the armed forces of Tubman Security Consultants on the southern flank of the Gulf of Guinea need to be further strengthened, and political figures from various countries need to be further persuaded to join hands to combat piracy. This requires Tianyue to integrate the forces it has operated in the Gulf of Guinea over the years.
Resources are tilted toward the southern wing of the Bay Area.
Jacques Césaire submitted the report to the group and also frankly stated this to Cao Mo. He hoped that Tianyue itself could also work hard to promote closer cooperation in the future.
Cao Mo's purpose was to bring Langhua Oil back to the warships in the Gulf of Guinea.
If the previous Quekotos drilling robbery made Langhua Petroleum hesitant to send its domestic employees to work directly on the drilling platform, Langhua Petroleum can invest more new capital.
Cao Mo asked Sturgeon to rush to France on his behalf, go to the headquarters of Langhua Petroleum, and contact and negotiate with senior executives of Langhua Petroleum and the big investors behind the scenes.
Cao Mo's cooperation plan is relatively simple, that is, the price of Fulkov Petrochemical is US$1.5 billion, and the price of Fulkov Oilfield Service is US$2 billion. The total price of the merger is US$3.5 billion, and then the minimum price of Langhua Petroleum will be accepted.
At 10%, the maximum capital injection shall not be higher than 20%.
Internally, Langhua Petroleum has been vacillating between selling and restarting the Quekotos Oilfield in recent years.
The appearance of Tianyue not only gave them a third option.
And this third option is more exciting than the two plans they were wavering about before, and the benefits can be maximized.
ensure.
After more than half a year of contact, it was enough for Langhua Petroleum’s senior management to have a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of Tianyue Investment’s industrial layout and profound influence in the Gulf of Guinea.
At least in the Gulf of Guinea region, Langhua Petroleum will never be embarrassed by choosing Tianyue Investment as its strategic investment partner.
The history of Langhua Petroleum's establishment is much longer than that of Evans Fund, which also makes Langhua's equity and the decision-making structure between the board of directors and top management more complicated.
Generally speaking, management has more say.
From the perspective of the top management, the larger the actual business scale of Langhua Petroleum, the greater their power and influence. If the assets become more monetized, the role and influence that the top management can play
, in fact, the investors who have been weakened, especially the investors of Langhua Petroleum, are mainly composed of chaebol family management foundations. They are very proficient in the management of monetary assets. If the Quekotos Oilfield is successfully sold, investors will inevitably demand dividends.
Distribute rather than leaving huge amounts of funds in the group's accounts.
Therefore, senior management generally tends to support the restart plan.
After receiving the report from Jacques Césaire, members of the Langhua Petroleum Decision-making Committee quickly held a special meeting. The two groups also quickly reached an agreement and tended to inject capital into the Fulkov Petrochemical Group to ensure the safety of Kuikoto.
It is hoped that the restart of the oil field can be further promoted.
However, it is not recommended to use cash directly for capital injection.
Langhua Petroleum has been engaged in offshore oil exploration in Europe for a long time. More than ten years ago, Langhua Petroleum's offshore oil fields to the west of Europe saw its production shrink, so it was thinking of carrying out a new round of expansion before Europe.
Another ten years have passed, and Langhua Petroleum's crude oil production in Europe has been less than half of its peak, and a number of drilling platforms and offshore vessels have become surplus.
Langhua Petroleum previously had a large number of equipment and facilities that were rented out at high prices, but the subprime mortgage crisis swept the world, and the pace of recovery in Europe was far slower than that in Asia and North America. As a result, a considerable number of equipment and facilities were idle there.
Langhua Petroleum plans to use a batch of idle equipment and facilities to inject them into the Fulkov Petrochemical Group at a discount of US$500 million in exchange for 12.5% of the shares.
For Langhua Petroleum, this is equivalent to activating the Kuikotos Oilfield and reorganizing the existing fixed assets to achieve greater benefits.
Cao Mo did not refuse this. After all, Fulkov Petrochemical did not have a strong position in the industry. It was not easy to purchase large-scale offshore equipment and facilities.
At present, the top management of Langhua Petroleum is inclined to retain the Quekotos Oilfield, so it may be willing to make greater concessions on the valuation of these second-hand offshore equipment and facilities.
In the previous cooperation, Langhua Petroleum treated the dead horse of Kuikotos Oilfield as a living horse doctor. The cooperation conditions were extremely loose and open to both parties, so the progress was very fast. This time, although both parties have positive intentions,
But to carry out formal, bundled and close cooperation, Langhua Petroleum's urinary nature as a long-established European company will be exposed.
To put it nicely, it is rigorous, but to put it poorly, it is cumbersome and procrastinating.
Sturgeon, on behalf of the chairman of the Fulkov Petrochemical Group, talked with the senior management of Langhua Petroleum. The two parties agreed in principle to cooperate. However, a memorandum of understanding in the early stage of the meeting, which was not legally binding, was reviewed by Langhua Petroleum’s legal team.
It took three days before it was officially signed; for the more formal framework agreement, Langhua Petroleum hoped that Cao Mo would come forward in person to endorse the agreement.
Considering the complexity and redundancy of subsequent negotiations, Cao Mo considered officially setting up an office in Paris in the name of Fulkov Petrochemical or Tianyue Investment to be responsible for communication and liaison with Langhua Petroleum.
Otherwise, Cao Mo felt that if the negotiations dragged on for a year or two, both parties might not be able to sit down and sign a formal cooperation agreement.
Although for such a large-scale cross-border cooperation, it is a normal rhythm in the world to negotiate for one or two years before officially signing the contract, but Cao Mo does not have this patience.
At the same time, he does not know whether the situation in the Gulf of Guinea will undergo unexpected and huge changes within one or two years. If cooperation is promoted as soon as possible, and Langhua Oil can be brought onto the warship in the Gulf of Guinea, their final chance of victory will be one point higher.
However, it is easy to set up an office, but who will be in charge of this office and maintain timely communication with the senior management of Langhua Petroleum on behalf of Fulkov Petrochemical or Tianyue Investment?
Sturgeon is mainly responsible for the affairs of Atlantic Bank, Huang Hebin has a heavier burden, and it is even more impossible for Xie Sipeng, Yang Deshan and others to escape.
Insert an app: a perfect replica of the old version of the book-chasing artifact and replaceable source app - Mimi Reading.
Cao Mo originally wanted to transfer Chen Feng or someone to take charge temporarily, and then cancel or arrange for an ordinary manager to take charge after the agreement was reached.
But it was Song Yuqing who wanted to come over and take charge of this office in person.
Song Yuqing's mother has a bad heart and has not fully recovered from the operation. In recent years, the haze in Xinhai has been severe, and Song Yuqing's mother will have obvious physical discomfort in winter.
The doctor's advice is to recuperate in an area with a suitable climate and better environment.
Song Yuqing couldn't leave Xinhai before, and her mother couldn't leave Xinhai alone to live in another unfamiliar city. Since someone needs to be responsible for setting up an office in Paris, Song Yuqing thought of bringing her mother here to recuperate for a while.
In addition, there are international flights from Paris to Draculamore, a flight of more than six hours. Song Yuqing thought that since she was in Paris, it would be much more convenient to go to Draculamore to meet Cao Mo...